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The dead capital thesis of de Soto has raised a lot of debate on the relationship 
between formal property titles and access to credit. Various authors have argued 
that overconcentration of policy efforts on providing formal property titles 
could be overly simplistic. The argument has largely been made along the logic 
espoused in the ‘dead capital theses’. However, more than a formal title is 
required to access credit from formal financial institutions by small businesses. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the critical factors inhibiting credit access 
by SMEs and assess the relative importance of formal titles amongst the other 
factors responsible for the financing gap. Surveys were conducted amongst 
officials of various financial institutions using structured questionnaires. The 
data was analysed using factor analysis. The results show that formal lenders 
perceive the absence of formal property titles to be a factor inhibiting SMEs 
credit access albeit the exact effect is very marginal relative to other factors.  
Keywords: Access to credit; Dead capital; Financial institutions; Formal 
property title; SMEs.
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1. Introduction
Africa’s development remains a paradox. The continent is rich in diverse 
resources and has vast supply of arable land. Yet the continent ranks high on 
almost all global poverty indicators. An estimated 30 out of the 54 (55.6%) 
African countries are part of the 50 poorest countries globally, and about a third 
of its 1.1 billion people live on less than $1.25 a day (Human Development 
Index, 2014). As a dominantly agrarian continent, land remains a critical 
asset in poverty reduction. However, a considerable proportion of land in 
Africa is not covered by formal titles. As at 2003, the influential World Bank’s 
economist, Klaus Deininger estimated that about 90 percent of land in Africa 
is not documented. More recent estimates indicate that this situation has not 
witnessed any material improvement (UN-Habitat, 2015). From the perspective 
of international development organisations such as the World Bank (2003; 2006) 
and neoliberal policy advocates such as Hernando de Soto (1989; 2000), this 
acute dearth of formal land title is a major cause of Africa’s underdevelopment. 
According to Boone (2017), land titling in Africa is a tool to legally empower 
the poor and secure their access to land-based resources. By extension, titling 
is seen as a poverty reduction tool. Obeng-Odoom (2013) thus observes that 
the role of secure property rights in poverty reduction and societal progress has 
been at the forefront of liberal philosophy and political economic thought since 
the eighteenth century. Obeng-Odoom and Stilwell (2013) however note that the 
reductionist interpretation of secure property rights that has over-concentrated 
on expensive land titling programmes has yielded little.
In what has now become known as the ‘dead capital thesis’, de Soto 
(2000) forcefully argues that land in Africa and other developing countries is 
embedded with considerable wealth, yet these lands are not covered by formal 
titles. Therefore, this wealth cannot be leveraged to access credit from banks 
and other financial institutions by small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs). 
As a result, these entities are often left with inadequate resources to invest, 
create jobs, reduce poverty, and ultimately enhance living standards. De Soto 
(2000) summarizes this as follows:
‘Because the rights to these possessions are not adequately documented, these 
assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside of the narrow 
local circles…. and cannot be used as collateral for a loan’ (De Soto, 2000: 6).
Abdualai and Owusu-Ansah (2014) strongly disagree with anything that 
seems to suggest that the solution to the problem of access to formal credit 
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markets and poverty in developing countries lies in the mere provision of 
formal property titles.
In his ‘dead capital thesis’, de Soto (2000) posits that, the difference between 
the developed and the developing nations is the ability of the developed nations 
to create capital from their assets; unlike the developing countries. Again, de 
Soto (2000) argues that every parcel of land and building is represented by a 
property document in the developed world. The result of this according to de 
Soto (2000) is the high level of development in the West, whilst the third world 
remains largely undercapitalized and underdeveloped.
The ‘dead capital thesis’ has been embraced with all enthusiasm by the 
developing world and their international development partners such as the 
World Bank. For example, the World Bank’s World Development Report (2006) 
argues that titling ‘has potentially large benefits’ (p. 165). Olutupe, Ngwoke and 
Akinlabi (2017) seem to agree with this assertion as they observe that SMEs lack 
of formal titles deprives them of the right to use their property as collateral to 
access credit. Following from this logic, the Ghana Land Administration Project 
for example sought to undertake ‘titling and registration of 300,000 parcels of 
urban land” to individuals. In addition, it sought to acquire at least 80 allodial 
titles’ as part of efforts to reduce poverty (World Bank, 2003, p. 3). The ‘dead 
capital thesis’ has in effect become the basis for policy decision. 
In the era of globalization and market liberalization, the private sector is 
increasingly being seen as a key player in reducing poverty and expediting 
economic development. Therefore, providing the enabling environment for the 
private sector to thrive is often seen as one major tool to break entrenched poverty. 
Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirgüc-Kunt (2003) estimate that small businesses in the 
private sector account for over 60% of GDP and over 70% of total employment. 
This shows that majority of households on the continent are largely engaged in 
peasant farming or small businesses. Therefore, policies that will support the 
growth of the sector will have far reaching positive consequences in the fight 
against poverty. Nonetheless, small businesses remain severely challenged. 
According to Salisu (2006), the challenges limiting the growth of small businesses 
include: the unfriendly nature of the business environment; the complex tariff 
and non-tariff barriers impeding access to important export markets; and the lack 
of management, marketing skill and capacity to compete. Whilst acknowledging 
the existence of these barriers, it is argued that a much bigger concern to these 
businesses remains the problem of access to finance (Domeher, 2012a). In the 
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estimation of Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2006), the lack of credit 
reduces the growth rate of small businesses by 10 percent.
Collateral based lending is predominant in Africa with real property often 
seen as a more suitable form of security. Landed property is preferred because 
it is immobile and often appreciate in value over time.  However, the absence 
of secure titles to real property could undermine this attribute of real property. 
Indeed, a number of studies have investigated various aspects of this argument 
with mixed conclusions. There are those that have concluded that no clear 
relationship exists between formal titles and access to credit (Brown, Dimitrova, 
Ehrenberg, Heyes, Kusek, Marchesi, Orozco, Smith, and Ernesto, 2006; Carter 
and Olinto, 2003; Galeana, 2004; Gilbert, 2002; Petracco and Pender, 2009; 
Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998). Other studies (Boucher, Guirkinger, and 
Trivelli, 2005; Feder, Onchan, and Chalamwong, 1988) have however made 
conclusions in favour of the dead capital thesis that, formal property titles impacts 
positively on credit access. Domeher, Abdulai and Yeboah (2016) investigated 
the dynamics between universal banks and microfinance institutions with regard 
to the relationship between formal titles and credit access. They concluded that, 
though this relationship may exist, it depends on the kind of formal lender under 
consideration. So far the argument has mainly been limited to whether or not 
the possession of formal titles improves access to credit. Even the studies that 
have established this relationship fall short of examining the extent to which 
the possession of titles could promote access to credit. In other words, there are 
several factors that may inhibit access to credit by businesses. If formal titles 
can improve access to credit, then it is critical for policy purposes, to establish 
how important these titles are vis-a-vis the other factors.
It is in this regard that Deininger (2003) argues the overconcentration of 
policy efforts to register titles to land, based on the ‘dead capital thesis’ is 
overly simplistic. This is because, more than a formal property title is required 
to access credit from formal financial institutions. Hence, the questions which 
arise from the above discourse are: what are the other critical factors explaining 
the existence of the financing gap amongst SMEs? How critical are these factors 
relative to the absence of secure property titles in creating the SME financing 
gap? Answers to these questions may, or may not provide a justification for 
the wide spread and huge expenditure on land titling programs across the 
developing world. This could also highlight other potentially critical barriers to 
credit access requiring more urgent policy attention. Unfortunately, these issues 
are largely unexplored by empirical research in Ghana. The aim of this paper 
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therefore, is to examine lenders’ perceptions on the critical factors inhibiting 
credit access and the relative importance of these factors. The paper thus seeks 
to contribute to the existing literature on the subject matter in Ghana by first 
identifying the range of factors explaining SMEs failure to secure formal loans 
and secondly, examining the relative importance of these factors. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows: section two provides background information on 
formal property and SME credit in Ghana; section three and four examines the 
theoretical and empirical literature; in section five the research design adopted 
for the study is explained; whilst the findings and conclusions are outlined in 
sections six and seven respectively.
2. The Ghanaian context: Formal property and SME credit
SMEs play a very central role in promoting economic development in Ghana. 
Abor and Quartey (2010) observed that they act as consumers of industrial 
output to further stimulate growth of other sectors. In addition to their role as 
prolific creators of jobs, they are seen as the beginning of larger businesses 
as well as the fuel for the overall economic engine (Abor and Biepke, 2006). 
In Ghana, 85% of manufacturing related employment comes from SMEs; 
they contribute 70% to GDP; constitute 92% of all businesses; and they also 
make up 80% of the private sector (Abor and Quartey, 2010). About 90% of 
businesses registered at the registrar general’s department are SMEs and 90% of 
the private sector consists of small businesses (Mensah, 2004). However, SMEs 
are continually besieged by several challenges which constrain their overall 
development, critical amongst which is access to credit. Even though Abor and 
Quartey (2010) established that a significant number of SMEs are failing as a 
result of reasons other than the lack of funding, some studies in Ghana have 
identified access to funds as a key constraint to growth. For instance, about 66% 
of all microenterprise loan applications in Ghana are most likely to be turned 
down (Aryeetey, 1998). Abor and Biekpe (2006) noted that about 90% of SMEs 
consider access to credit as the main barrier to new investments. Again, most 
small businesses fail in their first year due to lack of financial support. The 
success rate for firms applying for bank loans is almost 70% for large firms 
as against 45% for small-scale enterprises and 34% for microenterprises. In 
Ghana, it is estimated that 79% and 83% of micro and small scale enterprises 
respectively face credit constraints (Aryeetey, 1998). 
Even though there may be some more fundamental reasons for a business 
failing to start or progress, the lack of funds is often the most immediate reason 
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(Abor and Quartey, 2010). As aptly observed in Ghana by Abor and Biepke 
(2006), access to credit by small businesses remains a big challenge despite 
the introduction of several intervention schemes. Given their contributions to 
economic growth, it is important to ask why there exist this financing constraints 
amongst Ghanaian SMEs. Whilst bankers attribute the existence of this financing 
gap to the lack of viable or profitable projects, business owners attribute it to 
the lack of collateral (Aryeetey, 1998). In Africa, Aryeetey, Hettige, Nissanke, 
and Steel (1997) and Atieno (2001) put the blame on the high fragmentation of 
the credit markets into informal and formal segments. An estimated 51% of all 
firms refused credit in Africa is as a result of insufficient collateral; and 19% of 
people who do not apply for credit in Africa do so because of the high collateral 
requirements (Fleisig, 2006). It has been argued that the collateral problem stems 
from the lack of formal property titles, which renders the otherwise valuable 
property unacceptable for collateral purposes (de Soto, 2000). The absence of 
formal property titles is thus seen as a major barrier to credit access for small 
businesses in developing countries like Ghana. Irrespective of the argument 
often put up in support of the credit effects of formal property rights, Deininger 
and Goyal (2009) report that related empirical studies are few, outdated or non-
existent in some instances. The above arguments have led to a number of studies 
into the relationship between formal property rights and access to credit. In 
Ghana a number of studies have been conducted on this subject matter most of 
which tend not to agree that formal property improves credit access. It appears 
that only Besley (1995) found cases in Ghana where the possession of formal 
titles facilitated credit access and investment in agricultural lands.
Narh, Lambini, Sabbi, Pham and Nguyen (2016) investigated the implications 
of land reforms for credit access and agricultural investment in Ghana. The study 
points to obvious doubts on the relationship between formal property and credit 
access and argues that formal property rights do not necessarily lead to greater 
access to credit. In a comparative study of universal banks and microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) in Ghana, Domeher, Abdulai, and Yeboah (2016) found that 
whether or not formal titles will influence access to credit depends on the kind 
of financial institution under consideration. It was further observed that though 
lenders perceived formal property titles as important, the possession of same did 
not guarantee access to credit, neither did it guarantee improved loan conditions. 
In other studies conducted much earlier, Hammond (2008) observed that formal 
property rights make an insignificant beneficial contribution to credit access 
in Ghana whilst Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel, and Place (1991) did not find 
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evidence of a significant improvement in credit access as a result of formal titles. 
Majority of the studies in Ghana tend to focus on the demand side. It appears that 
the only studies that considered the supply side is the pilot study by Abdulai and 
Hammond (2010) and Domeher, Abdulai, and Yeboah (2016). It is important to 
give the supply side studies equal attention since the decision to grant credit or 
not will depend greatly on the lenders internal policies and practices.
Furthermore, studies on this subject in Ghana tend to look at the impact of 
formal property on credit access in isolation without considering the argument 
within the context of other critical factors that could impact credit access. This 
is required to be able to assess the margin of impact created by formal titles 
relative to the other factors so as to influence the debate that will engender a 
proportionate policy response. Narh et al. (2016) conclude that in discussing the 
issue of improved access to credit, other factors may have to be considered as 
factors such as access to markets and education were found to be important in 
improving credit access in Ghana. Domeher, Abdulai, and Yeboah (2016) also 
conclude that there are other critical factors apart from formal titles responsible 
for explaining the financing gap experienced by small businesses. They thus, 
recommend that studies be conducted to unearth these factors and examine their 
relative importance. It is in this light that this paper seeks to contribute to the 
debate on the subject matter in Ghana.
3. Theoretical review
The presence of information asymmetry in the credit markets around Africa and 
other developing countries imply that collateral will be an indispensable part of 
SME loan contracts. However, the ability to provide collateral is constrained 
by the high level of poverty and lack of assets (Besley, 1994). De Soto (2000) 
argues further that the problem of providing collateral is not limited to lack of 
assets per se, but the absence of formal titles over the land owned. Even the poor 
possess valuable assets in the developing world he argues. Land without a doubt 
is a highly desirable collateral asset and given the fact that a large proportion of 
the average household’s asset portfolio is made up of land, some are forced to 
believe in de Soto’s (2000) arguments. For instance, de Soto (2000) estimates 
that in Haiti, the sum of all the assets (mainly real estate) of the poor is 150 
times more than the total foreign investment the country received since its 
independence in 1804 (de Soto, 2000: 30-31).  Provided titles to land are issued 
in such context, such documentary proof of land ownership will facilitate access 
to credit. This will in turn become a catalyst to ‘unleash’ the ‘dead capital’ 
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which is embedded in land in order to expedite economic development and 
reduce poverty. In effect, titling land in developing economies is the panacea to 
economic development. 
The lack of formal property titles according to de Soto (2000) is thus to blame 
for the difficulty in accessing credit. Even though the poor possess valuable 
landed property that could enhance their access to credit, such properties are said 
to be defective due to the absence of formal property titles over them. He argues 
that property ownership in developing countries cannot be traced or validated 
and that no legal protection or enforcement of property rights exists. As a result, 
such property cannot be easily converted into money (either through sale or 
mortgage). Describing property in the developing world as dead capital, de Soto 
(2000) observes that landed property performs simple functions such as farming 
and shelter in the developing world, where as in the developed world this role is 
extended to the creation of capital for the enhancement of productivity through 
its use as collateral. For instance, in the United States, mortgage is said to be the 
most important source of funding for start-up businesses.
Over 50% of the total housing stock in Sub-Saharan Africa, 45% in East Asia 
and 25% in Latin America have no formal titles over them (Deininger, 2003). 
Indeed, recent estimates indicate that, 70% of all lands globally are not covered 
by formal titles and other forms of recognized documentation (UN-Habitat 
2015). This lack of broad coverage of titling is supposedly, the ‘defect’ that does 
not permit the use of landed property as collateral for credit to finance business 
or investment activities. It takes the institution of formal property rights to fix 
the capital potential of property in that, a formal property rights system lays 
down the code of best practice regarding the use and transfer of assets. This 
makes room for recording and storing the economic features of assets into a 
system which is then embodied in a title and thus allows for a validation of the 
existence of assets as well as the associated transactions required to discover 
the hidden capital in them (de Soto, 2000). Securing property rights (via titling) 
it is believed, will increase the certainty that land rights will be recognized; 
provide a secure basis for acquiring and disposing land rights; increase security 
and promote mortgage markets; provide security for land owners, lenders and 
traders, secure investments; unify land markets; improve access to formal 
credit; reducing poverty and promoting economic development (Payne, Durand-
Lasserve, and Rakodi, 2009; UN-ECE, 2005).
The availability of ownership information in the land register reduces 
information asymmetry on property ownership and also the transaction costs 
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in terms of time and other resources spent verifying land ownership data. This 
speeds up land related transactions by eliminating or drastically reducing any 
uncertainties and disputes surrounding land ownership. By promoting land 
market activities and facilitating land sales as argued above, registration may 
enhance the desirable qualities of collateral. This is because, if lenders are 
convinced that they will not be able to sell the land being offered as collateral, 
they may not accept it, and this could potentially hinder credit access. Property 
registration therefore by implication reduces the problem of lack of collateral 
which is perceived to be the main factor responsible for the limited access to 
credit (Berger, 1989; de Soto, 2000; Kakuru, 2008; Pearce, Davis, Onumah, 
and Butterworth; 2004). Property registration also provides lenders with the 
assurance that a given borrower has at least the legal right to mortgage a given 
property, and that there will be no disputes whenever foreclosure becomes 
necessary.  Foreclosure is further made easy by the earlier argument that, 
registration facilitates the operation of land markets, and this is particularly 
important because banks may not grant investment credit where active land 
markets are absent (Barrows and Roth, 1990).
An important feature of a good collateral asset is the value of the underlying 
asset. It has been argued that, securing property rights in the developing world 
will cause an appreciation in property values. Land values could appreciate 
by about 25% or higher upon registration because of enhanced tenure security 
(Brown et al., 2006). Others also estimate that the market value of land 
appreciates by at least 20 to 60% upon registration (Durand-Lasserve and 
Payne, 2006). With the high degree of land fragmentation in the continent, a 
rise in land values could increase their collateral value and possibly enhance the 
chance of obtaining credit. The combined implications of the above arguments 
are that securing property rights in the developing world will render landed 
property more suited for use as collateral, allow lenders to make credit more 
easily available to businesses and households with such properties, reduce the 
cost of the credit granted and also enhance the other terms of the credit contract 
(e.g. loan amount and maturity period) for the benefit of the borrowers.
4. Empirical literature
The aftermath of the de Soto’s (2000) ‘dead capital thesis’ has witnessed a flurry 
of critical literature, which examine the veracity or otherwise of the linkages 
between titling, access to credit. Such studies have largely yielded mixed results 
and inconclusive outcomes regarding the role of titling in ensuring access to 
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formal credit and economic development. While some studies have established 
a significant positive relation between secure property titles and credit access 
(Feder et al., 1988; Boucher et al., 2005), several other studies across the 
developing world found that either no relation at all exist between the two or the 
established impact on credit access was found to be insignificant (Brown et al., 
2006; Carter and Olinto, 2003; Galeana, 2004; Gilbert, 2000; Place and Migot-
Adholla, 1998; Mighot-Adholla et al., 1991; Petracco and Pender, 2009).  The 
causes of credit constraint among small businesses in the developing world have 
been established to be wide ranging. Aryeetey (1998) found that, bankers and 
business owners have different explanations for the existing credit constraints. 
Whilst bankers attribute the problem to the lack of viable or profitable projects, 
business owners attribute it to the lack of collateral. 
With empirical evidence from Africa, Aryeetey et al. (1997) and Atieno (2001) 
also attribute the problem to the high fragmentation of the credit markets into 
informal and formal segments, where each segments of the market focuses on 
meeting the credit requirements of specific groups of potential borrowers. The 
consequence is that there are some potential borrowers from one segment of the 
market (informal sector) who need specific kinds of credit not provided by the 
sector and at the same time are considered unqualified for formal sector credit. 
Information asymmetries, lack of collateral and high transaction cost have also 
been identified as the factors responsible for the SME credit constraint (Bester, 
1985; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Pearce et al., 2004; 
Beck, 2007; Beck et al., 2006c). At the other end of the spectrum, the absence 
of secure property titles has been identified as the reason why SMEs are credit 
constrained (De Soto, 2000; Deninger, 2003; Llanto, 2007).
Contrary to the argument that the absence of secure registered property titles 
hinders access to credit by making property lose its collateral value, Dower and 
Potamites (2005) found that landed property can be used as collateral even if it 
is not formally registered because people are able to use informal documents to 
demonstrate ownership. In support of this finding, de Laiglesia (2004) establishes 
that 68% of the private banks in his study required secure registered land titles 
whilst 6.7% accept unregistered properties as collateral. Reporting findings of 
a study in Bogota, Gilbert (2000) noted that the most serious problem faced by 
formal lenders is not the absence of registered property titles. This reinforces 
the findings of Brown et al. (2006) that even in cases where secure property 
titles are a precondition for securing credit, it is often not sufficient to trigger 
credit supply. Evidence from Peru indicates that loan applicants with registered 
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property titles on condition of receiving a loan, faced interest rates that were on 
average 9 percentage points lower than applicants with untitled property. Also 
Place and Migot-Adholla (1998) investigated the impact of registered property 
titles on loan size, interest rates and loan maturities and found that:
“…concerning loan maturities, the mean number of months for repayment of 
loans was 19.6 on land-secured loans and 24.8 for others. As for loan amounts, the 
mean size of land secured loans was 10,146 shillings as compared to 8,753 shillings 
for others. Neither of the results was statistically significant and thus no evidence 
was found to show that secure titles significantly alter the terms of formal credit” 
(Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998: 368).
Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) found that the possession of secure registered titles 
did not increase loan maturities for the sampled households. Deininger (2003) 
in his argument linking secure titles to credit access acknowledged the role of 
other important factors such as borrower’s repayment ability. He found that 
the credit effect of secure property titles depends on the individual wealth of 
borrowers. Brown et al. (2006) further confirm this finding in their study that the 
main reason why people may be denied credit is the low borrower repayment 
capacity and not the absence of secure property titles. Amongst all studies in 
Peru, Brown et al. (2006) established that none found a direct causal link between 
secure registered titles and credit access. Gilbert (2002) established that the 
formal lending decision is based on the ability of the borrower to demonstrate 
that they have a regular income sources and in some instances, proven track 
record of satisfactory loan repayment history. Unsurprisingly his study in 
Bogata established that the possession of secure titles to property either made 
very little or no difference to formal credit availability. In the case of Argentina, 
Durand-Lasserve and Payne (2006) found that no significant changes in credit 
access occurred after the introduction of secure property tiles. Field and Torero 
(2004) noted that providing secure property titles does not automatically make 
collateral based lending viable for majority of formal sector credit applicants. 
Subsequently Dower and Potamites (2005) concluded for the study in Indonesia 
that the possession of secure registered property titles is not the most important 
factor determining credit supply.
5. Research design
Research methodology involves the entire processes and procedures which 
are involved in collecting, analyzing and interpreting data (Cresswell, 2003). 
This study examined the issue of property titling and access to credit using the 
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quantitative methodology and survey strategy of enquiry. The study covered the 
main financial institutions involved in lending to SMEs (Universal banks and 
Savings & Loans Institutions and Rural Banks) operational in the Ashanti Region 
of Ghana in 2012/2013. The Ashanti region is one of the ten administrative 
regions in Ghana. The choice of this region was based on the fact that it is one of 
the biggest commercial centers with several active Financial Institutions.  The 
Ashanti region is in the middle belt and its population reflect a good blend of 
the north-south characteristics. It is the most populated region in the country 
according to the 2010 census (Ghana Statistical Services, 2012). Furthermore, 
it was one of the only two regions (Greater Accra and Ashanti regions) in the 
country covered by functional land title registration. Of the two regions, the 
Ashanti region was chosen for convenience given the researchers’ knowledge 
of the region. 
The participating financial institutions were identified based on information 
provided by the Bank of Ghana (BOG) on the institutions licensed to operate 
at the time. The information from the BOG (2012) indicates a total of about 22 
universal banks, six savings and loans institutions; and 25 rural banks were fully 
operational in the Region at the time of the research. The number of institutions 
selected to participate in the study involved all the 22 Universal Banks, all 
the six Savings & Loans Institutions and 20 Rural Banks. This brings to 48, 
the total number of financial institutions that participated in the study. In all 
the financial institutions selected, the key informants were the Credit officers, 
Loans managers and Branch managers. Though lending practices are largely 
governed by the institutional policies and not likely to differ based on the official 
involved, the study none-the-less involved the above categories of respondents 
at each institution to check for consistency/ reliability of the responses obtained. 
For 12 of the 22 banks, the researcher visited 2 branches each. For the remaining 
10 banks only one branch each was visited due to proximity issues. At each of 
these branches visited a maximum of 3 questionnaires were distributed to the 
relevant officials (in some cases fewer than 3 questionnaires were distributed 
depending on the availability of the official to participate in the survey). In the 
case of the 20 rural banks selected the researchers visited one branch each (since 
they tend to have very limited branch network and are often sited in rural areas). 
A maximum of 3 questionnaires were distributed at each branch visited. Two 
branches each of the 6 savings and loans institutions were also visited and at 
each branch a maximum of 3 questionnaires were also distributed. 
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Clusters of these banks and savings and loans companies could be found at 
various key locations in the Kumasi Metropolis namely: The Central Business 
District-Bantama area, Ahodwo-Atonsu area, Suame-Magazine area, the 
Asafo-Amakom area and the Ejisu-KNUST area. Therefore, apart from the 
rural banks, the other participating institutions were selected from these areas. 
One hundred (100) questionnaires were distributed to the target officials in the 
universal banks. Another 100 questionnaires were also distributed to the rural 
banks and savings and Loans institutions together classified in the study as 
MFIs. Thus a total of 200 questionnaires were distributed to officials who were 
available and willing to participate in the survey across the various institutions. 
The researchers visited various branches of these institutions and approached 
the relevant categories of Bank Officials with the questionnaire. Those who 
expressed interest were subsequently allowed some days to complete the 
questionnaire and the researchers returned on an agreed future date to pick up 
the completed questionnaires. In all a response rate of 54% was achieved.
A structured questionnaire was designed to capture respondents’ opinions 
on the reasons why SME loan applications are turned down by the lending 
institutions. Fourteen (14) different reasons why SMEs are denied formal 
credit were identified from the literature (see Table 1). This reduced the 
possible biases in the selection of the variables. The questionnaire composed 
of various statements reflecting these 14 variables (see attached questionnaire). 
Respondents were asked to rank these variables in order of importance on a 
14-point scale (where variables with mean ranks of 12 and above are classified 
as critical important; 9-11 are classified as very important; 6-8 are important; 3-5 
are least important and finally those with mean ranks less than 3 are classified 
as unimportant).
Critically important factors were defined as those that will always compel 
lenders to turn down credit applications; the very important factors are those that 
will mostly (but not always) cause lenders to deny SMEs credit; the important 
factors are those that sometimes cause lenders to turn down credit application; 
the least important factors on the other hand are the factors that rarely cause 
lenders to turn down SME loan application and finally, the unimportant factors 
are defined as those that do not influence lenders’ decision on whether to lend 
or not. The data collected was analyzed using factor analysis to explore the 
interrelationship amongst the fourteen factors to enable the researchers reduce 
these 14 items into fewer underlying factors/components (Field 2008). The 
relative importance of each factor was determined using the total proportion 
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of the variance explained by each factor. The results and discussions are 
presented below.
The consent of management was sought at the selected branches of the 
Institutions that participated. Respondents were provided adequate information 
on the purpose of the study and asked to indicate their consent by ticking the 
appropriate box on the questionnaire before proceeding to answer the questions. 
Confidentiality issues were appropriately taken care of. All respondents were 
given assurance that whatever information they gave would be treated with 
the highest degree of confidentiality. The questionnaire was thus designed to 
reinforce this by ensuring that it did not include any identifying information 
such as name of the bank and name of respondent.
6. Empirical findings and discussions
6.1. Respondent characteristics and descriptives
In total, 200 questionnaires were distributed to the relevant officials of the various 
lending institutions of which108 successfully completed and returned, representing 
a response rate of 54%. An overwhelming majority of the respondents in in the 
survey (64.8%) were males. The median age of respondents was 30-45years 
(48%).  A little more than half of the sample (53%) was made up of respondents 
from universal banks (UBs), 22% were from rural banks (RBs) and the rest from 
savings and loans companies (SLCs). The number of years a participant had spent 
with the current employer was used as a proxy for the level of familiarity with 
the institution’s policies on the subject matter, whilst the number of years the 
position has been held was used as a measure of the level of experience. Only 
31.5% of these respondents have been with their current institutions for less than 
five years compared to 68.5% who have been at their current institution for at least 
five years. Table 1 below provides the descriptive statistics on the 14 variables 
explaining why lenders may turn down an SME credit request.
The mean ranks shown in Table 1 below indicate that lenders attach different 
levels of importance to the 14 variables explaining their decision not to grant 
SMEs request for funding. Whilst some of these variables (such as: the perceived 
unprofitability of the venture, history of default in past loan repayment, high 
vulnerability of the business, and inability to generate sufficient cash inflows by 
the business) were rated critically important (mean >12), others were considered 
to be unimportant (mean < 3) in influencing lenders’ decision not to offer the 
needed credit to SMEs (high transaction cost; and bank’s preference to lend to 
sectors other than that of the business seeking the funding).
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table 1: descrIPtIve statIstIcs
Reasons for turning down SME loan 
applications
N Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation
Past Default In loan repayment (PDEF) 108 6 14 12.56 1.584
Poor cash flows (PCASH) 108 10 14 13.09 1.046
Low profitability of venture (LPROF) 108 11 14 12.90 1.067
High vulnerability (HVUL) 108 6 14 12.81 1.572
Lack of property to be used as collateral 
(LACPROP)
108 7 13 10.78 1.390
Lack of guarantor for the facility 
(LACGA)
108 7 13 9.82 1.723
Lack of/inadequate equity (INEQ) 108 2 13 7.20 2.402
Lack of business records (LACREC) 108 4 11 7.81 1.721
Weak banker-customer relationship 
(WBCR)
108 4 11 7.55 1.654
Lack of required documents 
(LRECDOC)
108 3 11 6.64 1.660
Lack experience in running business 
(LACEXP)
108 1 12 6.06 2.509
Lack of formal property title (LACTI) 108 1 7 3.74 1.561
Bank’s preferred sector  (BPS) 108 1 12 2.02 2.011
High transaction cost (HTC) 108 1 8 2.34 1.395
The inability of a business to generate sufficient cash or proof that a business 
is sufficiently profitable, the inability to meet past repayment obligations, and 
the high level susceptibility of SMEs to unforeseen future event are the top 
four critically important reasons explaining lenders decision not to grant credit 
to small businesses. Should the lender have the slightest doubt regarding any 
of these four critical reasons, the chances of rejecting the application increase 
considerably. From Table 1 however, it is clear that the high transaction cost 
of lending to SMEs and the kind of business to be financed by such credit 
are unimportant to lenders when it comes to deciding whether to lend or not. 
This appears to contradict the argument that link the SME finance gap to the 
existence of high transactions cost (Beck et al., 2006c). Indeed one of the central 
arguments of the ‘dead capital thesis’ is that formalizing property ownership 
reduces the transaction cost on landed property which then lowers lenders’ 
transaction cost when dealing with businesses (de Soto, 2000). This outcome 
is however not surprising because cost only becomes a problem for lenders if 
they are unable to pass it on to borrowers through higher interest rates and other 
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charges. Even though in reality the transaction cost of lending to SMEs may be 
high, the sampled lenders in this study were of the opinion that the mere virtue 
of this fact would not lead to businesses been denied credit. This is because 
Ghanaian lenders in practice pass on such cost to borrowers either through ‘cost 
of transaction charges’ or upwardly adjusted interest rates. This may partially 
explain the very high lending rates prevalent in the country. It should be pointed 
out that cost could affect the demand for and actual use of credit as such facilities 
become unaffordable to businesses.  Thus even though lenders may be willing 
to lend to SMEs, these businesses may be self-rationed due to the high cost of 
credit which is a consequence of the high transaction cost of lending to them.
The dead capital thesis of de Soto (2000) renewed the long standing capitalist 
inspired logic which attributes the lack of access to credit, high level of poverty 
and underdevelopment in the developing countries to the absence of secure 
property titles. The mass provision of secure titles has become top priority 
of most governments as part of the strategies to enhance access to credit by 
SME’s in order to reduce poverty and ensure rapid economic development. The 
result shown in Table 1 indicate that even though lenders have rated the absence 
of formal property titles as an important reason for turning down SME loan 
applications, there are other far more important factors. Indeed, using the mean 
ranks, the absence of secure titles was rated 12th out of the list of 14 reasons 
indicating that there are 11 other more important factors that explain lenders 
decision not to grant loans to SMEs. This confirms the assertion that there are 
more critical variables responsible for the SME financing gap (Domeher et al., 
2016; Narh et al., 2016). This thus gives the impression that the solution to the 
SME financing problem cannot come from policies geared towards formalizing 
property rights.
Based on the ratings in Table 1, factor analysis was conducted to explore the 
interrelationship amongst these variables and to explore the latent/underlying 
components/factors that explain the decision of lenders not to grant credit to 
SMEs and also explore the extent to which such lender decisions are influenced 
by each of these latent factors. To do this, the two variables which were rated as 
unimportant in Table 1 (with mean ranks < 3) were eliminated from the list. A 
third variable (weak lender-borrower relationship – which explains the length of 
time a client has been known to the lender) was also eliminated from the list as it 
could not be classified under any of the extracted components in the preliminary 
test conducted. The remaining 11 variables were used in the conduct of the 
factor analysis.
259
6.2. Validation of the factor model
To determine whether or not the data set is suitable for the conduct of factor 
analysis, the KMO and Bartlett’s test were conducted (see Table 2 below). The 
KMO test of sampling adequacy was greater than 0.5 which means the sample 
size is adequate for factor analysis (Field, 2000). Since factor analysis looks for 
clusters within a set of variables that measure similar things, the Bartlett’s test is 
used to determine whether or not these variables are reasonably correlated, that is 
to say whether clusters exist amongst the variables or not. The Bartlett’s test was 
significant (at p < 0.001; see Table 2). The correlation matrix in Table 3 below 
further confirms that certain clusters of variables are significantly correlated to 
permit the use of factor analysis in extracting the latent factors in the data set. 
Furthermore, multicollinearity was tested by looking at the determinant of the 
R-matrix. The determinant of the R-matrix was 0.002 (greater than 0.00001) 
which indicates that no serious problem of multicollinearity existed (Field, 
2000).The data set was thus considered fit for the conduct of factor analysis. 
table 2: kmo and bartlett's test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .579
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Appox Chi-Square 664.859
df 55
Sig. .000






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.3. The factor model
The number of factors to be extracted was not determined a priori, but was 
allowed to emerge from the data using the Kaiser’s criteria. This criterion is 
based on the use of eigenvalues which represent the variation in the outcome 
explained by each factor. Eigenvalues of 1 and above represent a significant 
amount of variation (Field, 2000). Hence factor analysis extracts all the factors 
with eigenvalues of 1 and above. Table 4 shows that a total of five clusters of 
the various variables referred to as factors/components were extracted from the 
11 variables through the principal component analysis method of extraction and 
varimax rotation. 
The factor loading for each variable is also indicated in Table 4 below the 
component number. The factor loading indicates how important each variable 
is to a given factor. For a sample size of about 100, factor loadings above 0.512 
are considered significant (Field, 2000). This shows that the variables in Table 
4 are significantly correlated with the components under which they have been 
classified. The five factors were given names by looking at the main issue that 
each set of variables describe. An examination of the variables under each 
component suggests that component one represents poor financial capability of 
the business; component 2 represents high default risk; component 3 represents 
lack of collateral; component 4 represents high level of informality amongst 
SMEs; and component 5 represents the nature of the business (whether it is a 
start-up or an already established business).
The Cronbach’s alpha reported for each component measures the reliability 
of the constructs in the model, that is to say, the measurement scale reflects 
consistently the construct that it intends to measure; a minimum of 0.6 is 
deemed acceptable (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham 2006). Hence 
the constructs and the model as a whole can be said to be reliable.
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table 4: rotated comPonent matrIXa
 
                                                                                                Components 
1 2 3 4 5
Component 1
Poor financial strength (Repayment 
Ability)














High level of informality
Cronbach’s alpha = .677
LREQDOC (personal IDs, proof of 





Nature of business (start-ups)
Cronbach’s alpha  = .830
INEQ .918
LACEXP .881
6.4. Predictive power of the factor model
The determination of the overall explanatory power of the factor model was 
done using the eigenvalues for each factor which shows the variance explained 
by that factor. This information is displayed in Table 5 below. The relative 
importance of each of the 5 factors extracted in Table 4 is shown in Table 5 
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below. The five factors together accounted for a combined total 85% of the 
variance in the model. In other words, 85% of the cases of unsuccessful SME 
loan applications were perceived by lenders to be attributable to the five factors 
extracted in Table 4 above.
table 5: total varIance eXPlaIned
Component Initial eigenvalues Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings



















































1 3.036 27.599 27.599 3.036 27.599 27.599 1.923 17.485 17.485
2 2.139 19.448 47.047 2.139 19.448 47.047 1.896 17.235 34.720
3 1.871 17.009 64.055 1.871 17.009 64.055 1.883 17.122 51.842
4 1.223 11.121 75.176 1.223 11.121 75.176 1.854 16.852 68.694
5 1.096 9.966 85.142 1.096 9.966 85.142 1.809 16.448 85.142
6 .704 6.404 91.546
7 .288 2.619 94.165
8 .272 2.471 96.637
9 .167 1.517 98.154
10 .114 1.036 99.189
11 .089 .811 100.000
6.5. Discussion and implication of findings
The factor model shows that, the five main factors influencing lenders decision 
to reject SME loan applications are of varying degrees of importance. The 
most important reason why SMEs are denied credit per this study is the poor 
financial capabilities (reflected by the net cash flow into the business and overall 
profitability of the business) they exhibit. This factor alone accounts for the largest 
proportion (about 27.6%) of the total explained variance. Indeed, a business that 
is not sufficiently profitable will be unable to generate sufficient cash to repay 
any credit advanced. A business that is profitable but unable to generate sufficient 
cash is most likely not going to be able to fulfill its payment obligations falling 
due. Since lenders are interested in getting the funds advanced repaid within an 
agreed period, any indications of a poor financial health will affect the assessed 
ability to repay on the part of the borrower. This will ultimately lead to a decision 
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not to grant the needed credit. The financial strength of the business is thus amore 
critical determinant of lenders decision to grant or not to grant credit to SMEs 
than the mere absence of formal property titles.  
This thus confirms the finding of Brown et al. (2006) that the main reason 
why small businesses are denied credit is the low borrower repayment ability, 
and not the absence of registered property titles. The above is also consistent 
with the results of a similar study in Bogota, which established that formal 
lending decisions is based on the ability of borrowers to demonstrate a strong 
financial capability (evidenced by regular predictable source of income/cash 
inflows) and that the possession of registered property titles made very little 
difference to formal credit availability (Gilbert, 2002). This finding provides 
important lessons at the micro level for SMEs. Small businesses must take 
basic investment appraisal more seriously to ensure that projects into which 
they invest their funds are sustainably profitable. Such businesses should be 
able to demonstrate how profitable their businesses are through their business 
plans which communicate critical business information to financial institutions. 
In a related study in Zimbabwe it emerged that Banks require SMEs to show 
their capital budgets so that they can assess their financial planning and credit 
worthiness. About 83% of these SMEs however did not keep capital budgets at 
all. This shows that SMEs take financing decisions on a whim (Matamanda and 
Chidoko, 2017).
In addition, SME owners most of whom do not pass their funds through the 
formal sector financial institutions always find it difficult to provide formal 
lender with the requisite evidence of sufficient cash inflows to secure credit. It 
is in this vein that Bondinuba (2012) established in a survey of SMEs that 48% 
considered the existing communication gap between financial institutions and 
small businesses as a major barrier to credit access in Ghana. Most of the SMEs 
may be profitable and highly liquid but their inability to communicate this 
effectively to lenders could cause them problems accessing funding. A change 
in such an attitude will enhance the image of small businesses (in terms of loan 
repayment ability) and could make it easier for them to secure formal credit.
The factor model shows that the second most important factor explaining 
lenders’ decision not to grant SMEs credit is the high default risk (responsible for 
19.4% of total variations) associated with lending to such businesses. Lenders 
generally considered SMEs to be very susceptible to unforeseen future events 
such that they could be looking very good today and tomorrow they are gone. 
The fact that these businesses are often inseparable from the individual owner 
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means that personal problems encountered by the owner also affect the very 
survival of the business. Furthermore, the SMEs that are denied credit mostly 
tend to have a poor credit history. The failure to fulfill past payment obligations 
by SMEs thus emerged to have a devastating effect on any attempts to obtain 
credit in the future. These factors work together to raise the risk profile of SMEs 
and make lenders skeptical in advancing credit to the sector. Even when lenders 
do decide to lend, they do so by charging exorbitant rates to compensate for the 
associated risk which is perceived to be high. This makes credit unaffordable 
and create a demand side barrier to credit access as SMEs become very reluctant 
to borrow at such unaffordable rates. 
Third in the order of importance is the lack of collateral (contributing about 
17% of the variance) required by lenders as part of the conditions for lending to 
most SMEs. The inability to provide collateral reduces the probability of success 
for businesses applying for credit because of high level of risk perceived to be 
inherent in SMEs. The provision of collateral provides the lenders with a safety 
net when lending to SMEs such that the absence of such a safety net reduces 
the willingness to lend creating a financing gap. This model thus confirms 
that, though collateral is important in the lending process, there are other more 
important prerequisites that must be met before credit is granted. Collateral is 
thus a last resort and the mere fact that one possesses collateral is not a guarantee 
that they will be granted the credit they require. According to Matamanda and 
Chidoko, (2017) 67% of the banks surveyed viewed the lack of collateral as the 
major obstructing them from accessing credit. 
Next in order of importance is the high level of informality in the operations of 
SMEs (this component is responsible for 11% of the total variance). Informality 
includes the inability of SMEs to keep proper books of accounts; inability to 
provide certain required formal documents such as bank statements, proof of 
address and personal IDs; as well as the inability to provide formal proof of 
property ownership in the form of formal titles to property. This model thus 
confirms that the absence of formal property titles could be a hindrance to credit 
access from the supply side of the market. However, the model also clearly 
shows that though the absence of formal property titles may be an important 
barrier to credit access together with two other variables shown in component 
four (see Table 4 above), it accounts for only 11% of the total variance of 85% 
explained by the entire model. Hence, property titles though important do not 
constitute a major supply-side barrier to credit access where it is absent.  This is 
in conformity with the findings of a demand-side study by Domeher et al. (2014) 
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which established that only 4% of all constrained loan applicants attributed 
their failure to obtain credit needed to their inability to provide formal property 
titles. Indeed, Durand-Lasserve and Payne (2006) after reviewing several cases 
concluded that there is no evidence that the provision of formal property titles 
significantly increases access to formal credit. These findings reinforce the 
argument by Brown et al. (2006) that though formal property titles may be a 
necessary condition for using the property as collateral for a loan, it is by no 
means a sufficient one to guarantee credit access. How then do the findings of 
this paper fit into the key theory on the relationship between formal property 
titles and credit access – ‘Dead capital thesis’ of de Soto (2000)?
To the extent that this paper has established the absence of formal property 
titles to be a hindrance to credit access, one is tempted to conclude there is some 
level of confirmation of the ‘dead capital thesis’. On the other hand, a second 
scrutiny of de Soto’s (2000) argument reveals a very extreme view of the role 
formal property titles could play in the overall economic development process. 
De Soto (2000) presents formal property titles as if it were the major reason 
businesses are unable to obtain credit in the developing world. On the contrary 
this study shows that at best the absence of formal property titles may become 
a barrier to credit access only in a few instances (11% of cases). This paper has 
thus shown that there are other more critical factors constraining credit access. 
The policy implication of this at the macro-level is that implementing property 
titling programs in Ghana as a major policy instrument for tackling the access to 
credit problem of SMEs as per the recommendations of the dead capital thesis 
will be missing the point greatly. As far as this study is concerned, the provision 
of formal property titles nationwide will do very little in solving SMEs problem 
of access to finance. To be able to comprehensively tackle the problem of 
financing for businesses, all stakeholders must understand the solution does not 
lie in just formalizing property titles. Efforts must be made to identify the range 
of constraint factors as identified in this study. Furthermore, the scarce resources 
of the state must be allocated with priority given to addressing the major internal 
bottlenecks in the SME financing activity. As far as this this is concerned, the 
provision of formal titles will not constitute a major solution to the problem of 
credit access. This position is also supported by other studies cited earlier.
7. Summary and conclusion
The argument linking the provision of formal property titles to enhanced 
access to credit has gained prominence over the years. Governments across the 
developing world with the support of the World Bank have implemented various 
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programs to formalize property titles as a result of the popularly acclaimed dead 
capital thesis. The results of such programs as per empirical studies in the past 
have largely pointed to either a lack of or an insignificant impact of formal 
titles on credit access. A few studies have however established some amount of 
impact. In Ghana, no known study had investigated the factors hindering credit 
access and their relative importance with special focus on formal property titles. 
This paper sought to fill in this gap.
First, the paper concludes that indeed there are a number of factors responsible 
for the SME financing constraint. These factors however, are of different levels 
of importance as they influence lending decisions to different extents. The most 
critical barrier to credit access was found to be the weak financial strength 
exhibited by these businesses. This was followed by high level of risk associated 
with lending to SMEs and the lack of acceptable collateral. Second, the paper 
concludes that the lack of property titles does not constitute a major supply side 
barrier to credit access in most cases. Hence providing everyone with formal 
property titles may address the problem of credit access by only 11%. What 
this means is that the solution to the credit access problem does not lie in the 
mere mass provision of property titles. There are several other micro factors 
identified from this study which when given the necessary attention will greatly 
enhance credit access. The mass provision of formal titles with the main aim of 
enhancing credit access would thus only achieve very marginal impact.
Third, it is recommended that governments and NGOs working with the 
SME sector should channel some effort into helping small businesses overcome 
the major barriers to credit access. This can be done by helping to train such 
businesses to build their capacity in areas of basic investment appraisal skills 
and preparation of business plans, and proper book keeping. Also, educating 
them on the need to be integrated into the formal financial system by passing all 
monies through a bank account. The National Board for Small Scale Industries 
could be restructured and resourced to provide the above. These and several 
others could help provide lenders with a good picture of cash flow patterns, 
liquidity and profitability of such businesses. This will allow lenders to more 
accurately estimate repayment ability and reduce the perceived level of risk 
often associated with small businesses. 
Fourth, this paper has contributed to the literature by establishing the relative 
importance of the various factors constraining credit access by SMEs which 
allows for a determination of the margin of impact created by the various factors. 
This will permit researchers, policy makers, and other stakeholders to properly 
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reassess the proposed nexus between formal property and credit access. This 
should influence a policy rethink and lead to actions that can significantly improve 
credit access for SMEs rather than narrowly focusing on formalizing property 
rights. Finally, though the findings of this study are important, the robustness 
have not been tested against alternative measures and estimations. Furthermore, 
the sample is quiet limited which also limits the generalizability of the results. 
The results thus must be used with reasonable caution. It is recommended that 
future studies should consider expanding the sample. Such studies should also 
consider checking for endogeneities and robustness of the findings.
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